Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 7
Issue 4 Chief Judge Rader's Contribution to
Intellectual Property Law and Practice

Article 7

4-1-2012

Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief
Judge Rader
Peter Lee

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J. L.
TECH. & ARTS 405 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts by an authorized
editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS
VOLUME 7, ISSUE 4 SPRING 2012

ANTIFORMALISM AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT:
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUDGE RADER
Peter Lee *
© Peter Lee
Cite as: 7 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 405 (2012)
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1128

ABSTRACT
Commentators have long noted that the Federal Circuit
tends to produce formalistic patent doctrine that favors
bright-line rules over extensive engagement with facts and
context. This Article, however, argues that Chief Judge
Rader’s approach to patent law diverges sharply from this
methodological tendency. In particular, it explores Chief
Judge Rader’s rejection of formalism by examining his
contributions to three areas of patent doctrine: claim
construction, patentable subject matter, and the written
description requirement. Throughout his engagement with
patent law, Chief Judge Rader exhibits a striking sensitivity
to context, policy considerations, and exogenous sources of
authority that distinguishes himself from his more
formalistic colleagues. The Article concludes with a brief
normative assessment of Chief Judge Rader’s
“antiformalist” methodology and its value to patent
jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Individuals and the organizations to which they belong
sometimes display remarkably different characteristics. While the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has long been
characterized as producing formalistic patent doctrine, 1 this Article
contends that its Chief Judge does not share those tendencies. Just
as parts sometimes differ from the whole, this Article departs from
the others in this collection by focusing on Chief Judge Rader’s
methodological orientation rather than his specific doctrinal
contributions to intellectual property law (though the two, of
course, are intimately intertwined). It argues that, contrary to the
1

See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in
Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1
(2003); Peter Lee, Patent Law and The Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010)
[hereinafter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures]; Arti K. Rai, Engaging
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal
Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 776 (2003). This is not to suggest, of course,
that members of the Federal Circuit are homogenous in their methodological
preferences. Cf. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1105, 1159-63 (2004) (situating Federal Circuit judges on a “procedural”
versus “holistic” continuum regarding their approach to claim construction).
Furthermore, this characterization of Federal Circuit jurisprudence as formalistic
has not gone uncontested. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Formalism, Realism, and Patent
Scope, 1 IP THEORY 88 (2010) (arguing that claim scope doctrine appearing to
be formalistic on its surface is actually quite flexible and indeterminate).
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general orientation of the Federal Circuit, the patent jurisprudence
of Chief Judge Rader reflects a striking rejection of formalism and
a concomitant embrace of holism, realism, and context. 2
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the widely
held conception that the Federal Circuit produces formalistic patent
doctrine. It further explores the nature and meaning of formalism
and its many methodological opposites. Part II examines Chief
Judge Rader’s rejection of formalism by considering his
jurisprudence across three areas of patent doctrine: claim
construction, patentable subject matter, and the written description
requirement. Throughout his engagement with patent law, Chief
Judge Rader exhibits a sensitivity to context and exogenous
sources of authority that distinguishes his jurisprudence from
traditionally formalistic Federal Circuit doctrine. Part III provides
a brief normative assessment of Chief Judge Rader’s contrarian
methodology and its value to patent law.
I. FORMALISM AND ANTIFORMALISM IN PATENT DOCTRINE
Federal Circuit patent doctrine has long been characterized as
formalistic. 3 Formalism, of course, is subject to a wide variety of
definitions and connotations, and it can operate at many levels of
judicial decision making. 4 To begin, the Federal Circuit often
creates substantive patent doctrine that is highly formalistic. In this
context, by formalism I am referring to the court’s emphasis on
deciding cases “according to rule.” 5 In articulating new patent
2

Throughout this Article, I will refer to Judge Rader as “Chief Judge” to
reflect his current title, which he assumed on June 1, 2010.
3
See supra note 1.
4
See generally Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”:
Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 531 (1999); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative RuleFormalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of
Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1999); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
5
Schauer, supra note 4, at 510. These rules may be articulated in statute,
and one conception of formalism refers to a mode of statutory interpretation that
elevates textual fidelity over legislative intent and contextual factors. In general,
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doctrine, the Federal Circuit routinely favors bright-line rules over
discretionary standards. 6 Such doctrine tends to eschew “totality of
the circumstances” tests that admit numerous contextual factors.7
Accordingly, formalistic frameworks tend to unfold according to
an internal logic whereby syllogism takes precedent over realism
and context. 8 Such attributes characterize a significant proportion
of Federal Circuit patent doctrine, and there is evidence that it has
become more formalistic over time. 9 In addition, the Federal
Circuit tends to be formalistic not only in the substantive doctrine
that it produces, but in its reasoning as well. Unlike many other
appellate courts, the Federal Circuit rarely ventures beyond
traditional legal authorities to cite empirical and economic
scholarship 10 or international law to support its decisions.
Furthermore, the court rarely offers policy rationales for the
doctrine that it produces.11
Federal Circuit formalism is evident in a number of doctrinal
I use formalism in a broader sense to refer to rule-based adjudication, including
instances where rules arise from judge-made rather than statutory law.
6
See Thomas, supra note 1, at 776 (noting that Federal Circuit doctrine
reflects “adjudicative rule formalism”).
7
See Schauer, supra note 4, at 510 (“[F]ormalism screen[s] off from a
decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into
account.”).
8
This inward orientation is illustrated, for example, in the Federal Circuit’s
approach to claim construction, which prioritizes intrinsic evidence (such as the
text of the claims themselves, the specification, and prosecution history) over
extrinsic evidence (such as expert testimony, dictionaries, and other outside
sources) as interpretive aids. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1,
at 29-33.
9
Thomas, supra note 1, at 773.
10
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 780-81 (2004);
Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of
Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
667, 678-83 (2002).
11
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from
the Supreme Court – And Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 804-05 (2010)
(“[A]lthough the Federal Circuit routinely recites policy justifications for the
statutory requirements of patent law, it rarely provides insight into the policy
rationale for its own decisions.”).
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areas. 12 For example, at one point the court adopted a highly
formalistic approach to prosecution history estoppel, an important
doctrine that constrains patentees’ assertion of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents. In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc,
adopted a complete bar approach to prosecution history estoppel. 13
Under this ruling, when a patent applicant narrows a claim element
during prosecution, she is estopped from later asserting any
equivalent of that element when alleging infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. As judges and commentators have
recognized, this is a highly formalistic, bright-line rule. 14 This rule
“truncates” judicial inquiries because courts need not consider
whether any technological equivalents survive the application of
estoppel, for none does. 15 Notably, the Supreme Court
subsequently reversed the Federal Circuit and established a flexible
bar approach to prosecution history estoppel in which contextual
factors may allow a patentee to assert equivalents to a claim
element even when prosecution history estoppel applies. 16
The Federal Circuit’s formalistic tendencies are further
reflected in its historical approach to nonobviousness. In a series of
cases, the court developed the so-called teaching, suggestion, or
motivation (TSM) test to guard against hindsight bias in
nonobviousness determinations. 17 Under the TSM test, an
invention is only considered obvious if there was some discernible
12

I explore these doctrinal examples at greater length in Lee, Patent Law
and the Two Cultures, supra note 1.
13
234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
14
See id. at 620 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(characterizing the majority’s decision as creating a “new rigid bright line
rule”); Holbrook, supra note 1, at 5; Thomas, supra note 1, at 783-86.
15
While Festo represents a formalistic decision in that it creates a brightline rule, it is antiformalistic to the extent that it reflects engagement with policy
considerations and the working details of the patent system. Indeed, the Federal
Circuit adopted this bright-line rule precisely because the flexible bar proved
unworkable in practice. As this case illustrates, characterizing a decision as
formalistic can be rather complicated, as the rule articulated and its justification
may have differing methodological orientations.
16
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S.
722 (2002).
17
See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine its constituent
elements. 18 As I have argued elsewhere, the TSM test represents a
doctrinal attempt to impose a rule-like framework around an
intrinsically nebulous, holistic nonobviousness inquiry. 19
Finally, one sees the Federal Circuit’s formalistic tendencies in
the law of patent infringement remedies. In MercExchange, L.L.C.
v. eBay, Inc., the Federal Circuit adopted a “general rule” of
virtually automatically granting an injunction after a finding of
patent infringement. 20 Among other implications, this syllogistic
rule (“if infringement, then injunction”) allowed courts to largely
ignore factors such as the nature of a patented invention, its status
as a component in a broader product, and the business practices of
the patentee in determining the appropriateness of injunctive
relief. 21 Here again, the Federal Circuit’s formalistic rule tended to
reduce contextual consideration and truncate legal inquiries.
In these disparate doctrinal areas, one sees a variety of distinct
but related dimensions of formalism. Formalistic doctrine
establishes bright-line rules that decrease engagement with facts.
Relatedly, formalistic reasoning prioritizes internal consistency
over sensitivity to external context. As I define formalism and its
connotations rather broadly, it necessarily has a wide range of
opposites. In laying the foundation for exploring Chief Judge
Rader’s “antiformalist” jurisprudence, it is helpful to examine the
many connotations of that term.
18

R. Polk Wagner & Katherine J. Strandburg, Debate, The Obviousness
Requirement in Patent Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 96, 98 (2006),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Wagner_Strandburg_Debate.pdf
(exploring doctrinal nuances and controversies related to the TSM test).
19
See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1, at 35-39. In
similar fashion, the Federal Circuit has also diminished the technological
demands of nonobviousness inquiries by elevating the importance of nontechnological “secondary considerations,” such as the commercial success of an
invention, within nonobviousness determinations. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 893 (2004).
20
401 F.3d. 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (articulating a “general rule . . .
that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged”) (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47
(Fed. Cir. 1989)).
21
See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1, at 40.
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First, antiformalist doctrine is attentive to facts and context. In
establishing substantive rules of decision, it favors flexible
standards rather than inquiry-truncating rules. Antiformalist
doctrine, moreover, may be holistic not only in its substantive
content, but also in its genesis and justification. Antiformalist
doctrine thus is “realist” to the extent that it responds to the realworld technical, institutional, and economic context in which
patent law unfolds.
Second, antiformalist doctrine tends to be more explicitly
focused on outcomes and policy objectives. 22 Formalistic
reasoning typically unfolds according to an internal logic in which
decision makers systematically apply unwavering rules to reach
legal conclusions. It thereby has a syllogistic character in which
legal opinions proceed as deductive proofs. Antiformalist
reasoning, however, is more attentive to outcomes and is mindful
of shaping legal rules to produce desirable results. This “bigpicture” orientation helps render antiformalist jurisprudence more
explicitly sensitive to policy considerations.
Finally, related to the notion of context, antiformalist reasoning
looks beyond traditional legal authorities, such as binding statutes
and precedent, when crafting new doctrine. In particular,
antiformalist jurisprudence is more likely to consult empirical and
22

One must tread carefully here, for formalism may also advance important
policy objectives. In particular, formalism may (but does not always) produce
more certain and determinate outcomes to legal disputes, see Schauer, supra
note 4, at 539, which is especially beneficial to motivating and safeguarding
investments in technological innovation. Furthermore, formalism reduces
cognitive burdens on decision makers, a particularly important consideration
when lay judges are charged with engaging and understanding unfamiliar
technologies. See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1. By
characterizing antiformalist jurisprudence as more explicitly policy oriented, I
am referring to antiformalist courts’ greater willingness to interpret and craft
doctrine in light of the overarching constitutional objective “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Several other
commentators have also noted a disconnect between the Federal Circuit’s rulebased formalism and the overarching policy objective of promoting innovation.
See, e.g., Rai, supra note 1, at 1040; Thomas, supra note 1, at 799; cf. Tun-Jen
Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 1353, 1402 (noting that “the policy goal of the patent system is a standard”
rather than a rule) [hereinafter Chiang, Rules and Standards].
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academic studies to buttress legal conclusions. Additionally, it is
more likely to consider foreign and international law for guidance
when shaping domestic doctrine. Antiformalism thus has several
dimensions, many of which are on display in the patent
jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader. The following Part explores
these antiformalist characteristics in Chief Judge Rader’s
contributions to three doctrinal areas: claim construction,
patentable subject matter, and the written description requirement.
II. ANTIFORMALISM IN THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF CHIEF JUDGE RADER
A. Appellate Review of Claim Construction
First, Chief Judge Rader’s sensitivity to context and realism is
evident in his approach to claim construction. Claim
construction—the process by which courts construe the meaning of
claim terms—often determines the outcome of patent litigation. 23
Partly because of its substantive importance, claim construction
has been a highly controversial issue at the Federal Circuit. Claim
construction has spawned several related debates, many of them
centering on the role of various institutions in interpreting claims. 24
A particularly important issue is the appropriate standard of review
of claim construction on appeal. 25 On the one hand, the Supreme
Court has held that judges rather than juries should construe
claims, 26 suggesting to some that claim construction is a legal issue

23

See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 205 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Newman, J., dissenting), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Kimberly A. Moore, Are
District Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8
(2001).
24
See, e.g., Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding
that judges rather than juries should construe claims); Phillips v. AWH Corp.
415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that courts should give
greater weight to intrinsic versus extrinsic evidence in construing claims).
25
See Jeffrey A. Leftsin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability
of Interpretative Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033-34 (2007).
26
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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that should be reviewed de novo. 27 On the other hand, claim
construction involves many factual findings on the part of trial
courts, which suggests a more deferential standard of appellate
review. 28 In Cybor v. FAS, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc,
attempted to resolve this dispute by holding that claim construction
is a question of law to be reviewed de novo on appeal. 29
Chief Judge Rader concurred in the judgment but dissented
vigorously from the court’s pronouncements on claim construction.
While recognizing that the standard of review of claim
construction “seems an esoteric legal topic,” 30 Chief Judge Rader’s
concurrence nevertheless appreciates its immense practical
significance. 31 Furthermore, his concurrence pierces the sophist
reasoning underlying the majority’s opinion that appellate courts
should review claim construction without deference. The majority
reasoned that trial courts may utilize expert testimony to
understand, but not interpret, claim terms, thus affording them no
institutional advantage relative to appellate courts (which, of
course, may not consult experts outside of the record). Chief Judge
Rader, however, argues that this distinction lacks merit, for a trial
judge’s ability to consult experts to understand claim terms would
undoubtedly inform her interpretation of those terms. 32 In a
broader sense, Chief Judge Rader significantly engages the
realities of trial and appellate adjudication, in which trial judges
may liberally consult outside information that appellate judges may
not. 33 In his view, these institutional advantages render trial court
claim constructions more worthy of deference on appeal.
Along similar lines, Chief Judge Rader’s concurrence
meaningfully engages the working details of patent adjudication.
He argues that deference to trial court claim construction would
fulfill the promise of early certainty in patent litigation, which was
27

See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc).
28
Id. at 1478 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment).
29
See id. at 1451.
30
Id. at 1474 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 1477 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment).
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a primary objective of allocating claim construction to judges
rather than juries. 34 In a decidedly antiformalist move, he marshals
empirical evidence to support his arguments, citing the Federal
Circuit’s general reversal rate of district courts as well as a study
revealing a 40 percent reversal rate (in whole or in part) of claim
constructions since Markman. 35 Such engagement with context,
particularly empirical studies, diverges sharply from the Federal
Circuit’s traditional formalistic tendencies. Mindful of the realities
of patent litigation, he argues that de novo review of claim
construction discourages parties from settling, as there is a
significant chance that the Federal Circuit will reverse a claim
construction on appeal. 36
Explicitly invoking
policy
considerations, Chief Judge Rader argues that deference to district
court claim construction would increase the efficiency and
decrease the cost and duration of patent litigation.
In a further antiformalist move, Chief Judge Rader advocates a
“functional approach” to establishing a proper standard of review
for claim construction. 37 Just as the objective of adjudicative
economy informed the allocation of claim construction to judges
rather than juries, Chief Judge Rader argues that functional
considerations should help allocate decisional power between trial
and appellate courts.38 He reiterates these functional arguments in
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., a subsequent case
involving the standard of review of claim construction. 39 Again
engaging in institutional competence analysis, Chief Judge Rader
34

Id. at 1475-76. Here, Chief Judge Rader refers to an earlier line of
precedent, culminating in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370
(1996), holding that judges rather than juries should perform claim construction.
This decision spawned the emergence of Markman hearings in which judges,
prior to the start of trial, construe claims. In theory, Markman hearings establish
early certainty around claim terms in patent litigation, a model upset by de novo
review of claim construction on appeal. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of
Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 32 (2000) [hereinafter Nard,
Claim Interpretation].
35
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1476 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment).
36
Id.; see Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 34, at 33.
37
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1477 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment).
38
See Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 34, at 32.
39
469 F.3d 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from the
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
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argues that district courts, which are closer to the facts of a case,
are better situated than appellate judges to construe technical
patent claims. 40 Reflecting an antiformalist orientation, Chief
Judge Rader consistently draws on policy, function, and
pragmatism, as well as a deep understanding of institutional
limitations, to argue for greater deference to district court claim
constructions. 41
B. Patentable Subject Matter
Chief Judge Rader’s antiformalist tendencies are also reflected
in his views on patentable subject matter. In In re Bilski, the
Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, considered the patentability of a
method for hedging risks in commodities trading. 42 More broadly,
this case presented the court with an opportunity to clarify the
distinctions between patent-eligible processes and those that are
not eligible for patenting. 43 In the majority opinion, then-Chief
Judge Michel articulated the machine-or-transformation test to
govern the patentability of processes. Under this test, a process was
eligible for patenting only if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine
or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different
40

Id. at 1044.
Notably, Chief Judge Rader’s holistic tendencies apply not only to his
preferred standard of review for claim construction on appeal, but to his
preferred methodology for interpreting claims themselves. While Phillips v.
AWH establishes an interpretative framework that privileges intrinsic over
extrinsic evidence, Chief Judge Rader has been characterized as a “pragmatic
textualist” who seeks greater engagement with context to understand and
interpret claims. Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 34, at 10-11; see
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he testimony of one skilled in the art about the meaning of claim
terms at the time of the invention will almost always qualify as relevant
evidence.”) (Rader, J.), abrogated on other grounds by Cybor, 138 F.3d at
1456); see also Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and
Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 340 (2007) (“A formalist
approach strictly limits the universe of permissible interpretative sources.”).
42
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
43
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (listing “process[es]” as a statutorily
recognized category of patentable subject matter).
41

416

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 7:4

state or thing.” 44 This is a relatively formalistic test, as it strives to
reduce a rather nebulous inquiry—the patentability of processes—
to two governing rules. 45 Applying this test, the Federal Circuit
denied the patentability of the subject invention. 46
Chief Judge Rader agreed that the invention at issue did not
comprise patentable subject matter, but he offered a very different
rationale. In its overall tone, Chief Judge Rader’s dissent is
sensitive to context; he takes the majority to task for adopting a
patent-eligibility framework better suited to “the age of iron and
steel” rather than the current era of “subatomic particles and
terabytes.” 47 In rejecting the machine-or-transformation test as the
sole test of process patentability, Chief Judge Rader turns instead
to longstanding precedent that natural laws, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter. 48 Relying on
this case law, Chief Judge Rader argues that the patent applicants’
method of hedging risk is nothing more than an unpatentable
abstract idea. 49
In addition to representing a different (and perhaps doctrinally
sounder) basis for denying patentability relative to the machine-ortransformation test, the abstract idea test is inherently more
holistic. 50 Whether or not a discovery comprises an abstract idea is
a complicated inquiry encompassing several considerations.
Abstract ideas represent “the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”51 As such, characterizing an invention as an
44

Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954, 956.
The Federal Circuit has been formalistic in other articulations of
patentable subject matter as well. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(articulating a rule that patentable subject matter comprises any process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter that produces “a useful,
concrete and tangible result”); see also Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures,
supra note 1, at 61 n.354.
46
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949.
47
Id. at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting).
48
Id.; see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
49
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting).
50
Cf. Chiang, Rules and Standards, supra note 22, at 1356 (“This ‘abstractidea’ doctrine is not capable of bright-line rules.”).
51
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
45
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abstract idea may require determining whether that asset helps to
facilitate broader, industry-wide developments and technological
progress. 52 An analogy can be drawn to another line-drawing
mechanism in intellectual property law: the idea-expression
dichotomy in copyright. 53 In that context, separating protectable
expression from nonprotectable idea often proceeds as a policy
determination inquiring into whether an asset is so abstract that
subjecting it to exclusive rights would effectively impair rather
than advance creative progress. 54 This instrumentalist orientation
also informs identifying “abstract ideas” in patent law and
manifests itself in Chief Judge Rader’s Bilski dissent.55
Emphasizing the patent system’s overarching utilitarian objectives,
Chief Judge Rader urges the Federal Circuit to “ask whether its
decisions incentivize research for cures and other important
technical advances.” 56 Notably, while Chief Judge Rader dissented
from the majority’s opinion, he received at least partial vindication
at the Supreme Court. On appeal, the Court rejected the machineor-transformation test as the sole test of process patentability and
held the applicants’ invention unpatentable as an abstract idea. 57
In addition to emphasizing context, Chief Judge Rader’s
patentable subject matter jurisprudence exhibits another
52

Cf. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1339
(2011) (arguing that courts should consider the “generative nature of the new
technology” when assessing whether it comprises an abstract idea).
53
See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L.
REV. 39, 80 (2008).
54
Id.; see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742
(9th Cir. 1971) (“We think the production of jeweled bee pins is a larger private
preserve than Congress intended to be set aside in the public market without a
patent. A jeweled bee pin is therefore an ‘idea’ that defendants were free to
copy.”) (emphasis added).
55
However, while policy considerations may shed light on identifying
abstract ideas, Chief Judge Rader remains sensitive to the line-drawing
difficulties of this doctrine. See Research Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft
Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]his court also will not presume to
define ‘abstract’ beyond the recognition that this disqualifying characteristic
should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of
eligible subject matter . . . .”).
56
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader, J., dissenting).
57
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
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antiformalist trait: engagement with foreign and international
patent law. In his Bilski dissent, Chief Judge Rader notes that the
European Patent Convention constrains patentable subject matter
more than its U.S. counterpart by restricting software and other
method patents and by prohibiting patents deemed contrary to the
public interest. 58 He disfavors such restrictions, and he argues that
the United States’ more expansive conception of patentable subject
matter has contributed to this country’s world leadership in
innovation. 59 These comparative considerations broaden the scope
of patent-eligibility analysis beyond traditional legal authorities
and reveal macro-level insights and policy objectives that can
guide unsettled doctrine.
Such engagement with realism and comparative insights is also
reflected in his “additional views” filed in Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec. 60 In this case, which
addressed the patentability of methods for evaluating the safety of
immunization schedules, Chief Judge Rader begins by observing
that many well-meaning attempts to constrain patentable subject
matter have merely encouraged novel claim drafting to evade such
constraints. 61 For example, prohibitions against patenting
mathematical algorithms 62 simply led patent applicants to claim
software inventions not as disembodied processes but as “computer
programs embodied in a tangible medium.” 63 Reflecting his realist
orientation, he notes that “[w]hen careful claim drafting or new
claim formats avoid eligibility restrictions, the doctrine becomes
very hollow.” 64 As Chief Judge Rader recognizes, attempts to
impose precise rules on patentable subject matter are vulnerable to
gaming by strategic behavior.
As in his Bilski dissent, he punctuates his arguments by
referencing foreign experience. He argues that the “real-world
impact” of subject matter restrictions is to “frustrate innovation
58

Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1012 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id.
60
659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
61
Id. at 1074 (Rader, J., additional views).
62
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-73 (1972).
63
In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
64
Classen, 659 F.3d at 1074 (Rader, J., additional views).
59
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and drive research funding to more hospitable locations.” 65 He
cites the European Patent Convention’s limitations on patentable
subject matter in the biotechnological realm, arguing that such
constraints helped shift innovative activity to the United States.66
Here as well, a policy-oriented view of the patent system informed
by comparative insights undergirds Chief Judge Rader’s defense of
expansive patentable subject matter.67
C. The Written Description Requirement
Finally, antiformalist characteristics are also evident in Chief
Judge Rader’s approach to the written description requirement. To
understand Chief Judge Rader’s position and reasoning, some
context is in order. The patent statute contains several provisions
defining the disclosure requirements for obtaining a patent. In
particular, 35 U.S.C. § 112 states:
The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention. 68
This statutory language has always been understood to create an
“enablement” requirement whereby a patent disclosure must teach
an ordinary artisan how to make and use a claimed invention.
Courts and commentators have long debated, however, whether
65

Id. at 1075.
Id.
67
Notably, this expansive conception of patentable subject matter parallels
normative arguments that patent eligibility should operate as a “coarse eligibility
filter,” leaving more finely-tuned analyses of patentability to other doctrines. See
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
cf. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 1041, 1065 (2011); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions after
Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 106 (2011).
68
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
66
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this provision also creates an independent “written description”
requirement, whereby a patent applicant must adequately describe
her claimed invention. 69
Even if one accepts that an independent written description
requirement exists, the exact contours of that requirement have
also been subject to debate. Traditionally, the written description
requirement functioned solely to police priority by ensuring that
amended claims were supported by an original disclosure. 70 In this
view, the written description requirement prevented patent
applicants from amending claims throughout prosecution to claim
technological subject matter that they had not described in their
disclosure (which is generally fixed at the time of filing). However,
in the 1997 case of Regents of the University of California v. Eli
Lilly & Co., the Federal Circuit extended the written description
requirement to operate as a substantive constraint on original
claims as well. 71 Many judges of the Federal Circuit, as well as
academic commentators, were quite uneasy with this purported
expansion. 72
In a series of opinions, primarily dissents, Chief Judge Rader
has consistently argued that the written description requirement
should function narrowly only to police priority for amended
claims. 73 While this position is notable in and of itself, equally
revealing is the antiformalist reasoning underlying it. Take, for
69

See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the
“Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure
Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 61 (2000) (“[T]he distinction between
the written description and enablement requirements is artificial.”).
70
See Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?:
A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the
Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 4 (2007).
71
119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
72
See, e.g., Holman, supra note 70, at 17-20; Janis, supra note 69, at 60.
73
See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from decision not to hear case en banc); Univ.
of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307-08 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Rader, J., dissenting from decision not to hear case en banc); Ariad
Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Rader, J., dissenting-in-part and concurring-in-part); see also Holman, supra
note 70, at 18 (“Judge Rader is probably the Federal Circuit’s most outspoken
critic of the Lilly doctrine.”).
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example, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., a case in which
the majority endorsed a capacious view of the written description
requirement.74 In his dissent from the denial of the decision not to
rehear this case en banc, Chief Judge Rader relies significantly on
functional considerations to argue for a narrower conception of the
written description requirement. He first observes that at the time
of the first statutory codification of the words “written description”
in 1793, patents did not require claims. 75 As such, the written
description (i.e., specification) played the crucial function of
demarcating the boundaries of a patentee’s asserted property right.
Subsequent statutory interventions, however, resulted in the
requirement of formally claiming patented inventions. In Chief
Judge Rader’s view, given that the claims now served to delimit
patent scope, the only function left to the specification was not to
“describe” the invention but to enable a person of ordinary skill in
the art to make and use it. 76
According to Chief Judge Rader, this doctrinal landscape
changed in 1967, when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
a precursor to the Federal Circuit, decided In re Ruschig. 77 In this
case, the C.C.P.A. “calved a new [written description] doctrine out
of the § 112 enablement requirement” for the sole purpose of
policing new matter in claims, i.e., claim amendments. 78 Thus, the
“origin and purpose” of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and the modern role of
claims in delimiting patent scope reveal that the proper function of
the written description requirement is to police priority for
amended claims. 79 Ultimately, history and function inform Chief
Judge Rader’s more modest conception of the written description
requirement.
In arguing for a narrow conception of the written description
requirement, Chief Judge Rader’s antiformalist reasoning
manifests itself in another way: through extensively engaging
74

323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 977 (Rader, J., dissenting from decision not to hear case en banc).
76
Id.
77
54 C.C.P.A. 1551 (1967); see also Janis, supra note 69, at 59.
78
323 F.3d at 978 (Rader, J., dissenting from decision not to hear case en
banc); see Janis, supra note 69, at 59.
79
Id. at 983.
75
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academic scholarship. 80 In his Enzo Biochem dissent, Chief Judge
Rader cites several academic articles highlighting the novelty of
applying the written description requirement to constrain original
claims. 81 These academic treatments lend support to his contention
that the written description requirement should only be used to
police priority for amended claims. Chief Judge Rader’s
engagement with academic research assumes far greater
proportions in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc. 82
In his dissent from the decision not to hear this case en banc, he
reiterates his arguments against extending the written description
requirement to substantively constrain original claims. 83 Here,
however, he relies powerfully on academic commentary to support
his views. His examination of the literature “shows 31 articles
criticizing the Eli Lilly doctrine, 7 articles defending the doctrine,
and 16 neutrally commenting on the state of this evolving case
law.” 84 Quite remarkably, Chief Judge Rader attaches as an
appendix a lengthy table citing and quoting from each of these
academic sources. 85 He repeats this reliance on academic
commentary in his partial concurrence and dissent in Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the recent en banc case
holding that the written description requirement does indeed apply
to both original and amended claims. 86 Such engagement with
80

Such willingness to cite scholarship is perhaps not surprising given his
significant teaching experience and ties to academia.
81
323 F.3d at 982-83 (citing Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats:
Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly
Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2000), Janice M.
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 (1998), Arti K. Rai,
Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (1999), Harold C. Wegner, An Enzo White Paper: A
New Judicial Standard for a Biotechnology “Written Description” Under 35
U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 254 (2002)).
82
375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting from decision
not to hear case en banc).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1309.
85
Id. at 1314-25.
86
598 F.3d 1336, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Rader, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting “the extensive academic criticism of this
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academic literature is quite unique within Federal Circuit
jurisprudence and reflects Chief Judge Rader’s willingness to look
outside of traditional legal authorities to craft patent doctrine.
III. ASSESSING A METHODOLOGICAL CONTRARIAN
The primary aim of this Article is to describe Chief Judge
Rader’s antiformalist orientation, which distinguishes him from the
commonly-perceived formalistic tenor of Federal Circuit patent
doctrine. Nevertheless, a brief normative appraisal is in order as
well. On the one hand, antiformalist jurisprudence may temper the
rigidity, reductionism, and indifference to context often associated
with formalism. These critiques apply with particular force to the
patent jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit. 87 On the other hand,
antiformalism is itself susceptible to criticism as producing
doctrine that is indeterminate, inconsistent, and unpredictable. 88
Indeed, holistic frameworks may be particularly difficult to apply
in the context of patent law, as they often intensify lay judges’
engagement with technologically challenging subject matter.89
Such critiques may apply to Chief Judge Rader’s views; for
example, precisely identifying an “abstract idea” for the purposes
of determining patentable subject matter is not an easy task, and
reasonable courts may draw different conclusions from similar
factual predicates. 90
Of course, one rough measure of judicial “success” involves
product of judicial imagination”).
87
Cf. Thomas, supra note 1, at 775 (“[A]n orientation toward rules
threatens to make the patent law hidebound and unresponsive to changing
conditions.”).
88
Cf. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577, 578 (1988) (distinguishing between hard-edged, crystalline legal precepts
and “fuzzy, ambiguous” rules of decision).
89
Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1.
90
See Chiang, Rules and Standards, supra note 22, at 1385-86. As noted,
Chief Judge Rader has demonstrated some sensitivity to these difficulties in
articulating (or refusing to articulate) the contours of the abstractness doctrine.
See supra note 55. Perhaps reflecting the difficulty of crafting patentable subject
matter doctrine, the Supreme Court recently revisited this topic in Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
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carrying the weight of the court, and in this sense, Chief Judge
Rader’s efforts have often not been successful. Notably, in each of
the doctrinal areas examined—claim construction, patentable
subject matter, and the written description requirement—Chief
Judge Rader’s antiformalist sentiments have been expressed in
dissent.91 Chief Judge Rader may be the exception that proves the
rule; his engagement with holism, realism, and exogenous legal
authorities such as foreign law and academic scholarship
distinguishes him from his generally more formalistic colleagues.
Consistency with one’s colleagues, however, is only one
measure of success, and a rather impoverished one at that. From a
wider perspective, Chief Judge Rader’s antiformalist approach to
patent law has received some vindication at the Supreme Court,
which has produced notably holistic doctrine in reversing several
important lines of Federal Circuit precedent. 92 As mentioned, in
Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
holding that the machine-or-transformation test represents the sole
test for process patentability. 93 Rather, it denied the patentability of
the claimed invention by invoking the “abstract idea” line of
doctrine, thus paralleling Chief Judge Rader’s dissent. 94 It remains
to be seen whether Chief Judge Rader’s more antiformalist mode
of reasoning will continue to find vindication at the Supreme Court
in other doctrinal areas as well. 95
In a broader sense, just as this Article focuses more on process
than substantive outcomes, the value of Chief Judge Rader’s
contributions to patent law may depend more on his contrarian
91

This is not always the case. The brevity of this Article precludes
canvassing Chief Judge Rader’s antiformalist tendencies in other doctrinal areas,
but there are instances where Chief Judge Rader’s holistic views have carried
the court. See, e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting
that “[t]he Supreme Court’s admonition against a formalistic approach to
obviousness in this context actually resurrects this court’s own wisdom” from
earlier case law).
92
See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1.
93
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
94
Similarly holistic, in arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court “focused
not on semantic content but real-world commerce.” Chiang, Rules and
Standards, supra note 22, at 1390.
95
Cf. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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input into the work of the Federal Circuit rather than whether or
not his views are reflected in majority opinions. The Federal
Circuit was developed as a quasi-specialized court charged chiefly
with unifying and imparting greater certainty to patent law. 96 In
many ways, formalism has been an important tool in this project.
Throughout its history, however, the quasi-specialized nature of
the Federal Circuit has produced concerns over “tunnel vision,”
hypertechnicality, and doctrinal rigidity. There is a risk, in other
words, that in unifying patent law, the Federal Circuit may become
too unified itself. In this sense, Chief Judge Rader’s holistic,
contextual, and comparative jurisprudence represents a valuable
counterweight to the formalistic tendencies of the Federal Circuit.
While the importance of ideational diversity is most closely
associated with legislatures, courts, too, are deliberative bodies. 97
And in patent law, which does not have circuit splits, differences
among individual Federal Circuit judges often serve to identify
important issues for potential reevaluation and reform. 98 As such,
the value of Chief Judge Rader’s commitment to context and
realism may arise most centrally from the minority voice it
provides as the Federal Circuit continues to debate and craft patent
law.
CONCLUSION
While most of the contributions to this issue examine Chief
Judge Rader’s jurisprudence in particular substantive fields, this
Article takes a different approach. Rather than focus on a single
substantive topic, it examines Chief Judge Rader’s methodological
orientation across several doctrinal areas. The Federal Circuit has
long been characterized as creating rule-based, context-eschewing,
96

See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
97
See Hon. Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations: Guiding Principles as
Navigational Aids, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 763 (2004) (describing the
“extensive memo traffic” and “enormously robust” debate that precedes the
issuing of a Federal Circuit opinion).
98
See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme
Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 318-19.
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formalistic doctrine. The jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader,
however, exhibits a valuable commitment to holism, realism, and
context. In areas as diverse as claim construction, patentable
subject matter, and the written description requirement, he
demonstrates a refreshing embrace of policy-oriented, functional
legal reasoning and an openness to engage academic scholarship
and foreign patent law. Ironically, one of Chief Judge Rader’s most
significant contributions to patent law arises from his status as a
methodological contrarian of the court that he leads.

